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Gay Gentrification: Whitewashed Fictions




In 1986, in the midst of a rapidly spreading HIV/AIDS
epidemic,' the United States Supreme Court narrowly held there
was no constitutional right to engage in same-sex sodomy.' A
mere ten years later, the Court made a sharp departure from its
earlier posture towards sexual minorities.' In Romer v. Evans,'
the Court struck down a state constitutional amendment that
established a wholesale prohibition' of pro-sexual minority rights
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to meaningfully engage the public policy of marriage equality legislation with two
groups of Religious Liberty scholars led by herself and Douglas Laycock of the
University of Virginia. Many thanks go to the University of Georgia schools of Law
and Public Affairs, and the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives for research and financial
support. Finally, I wish to thank the phenomenal base of support I enjoy from
friends, faculty, and staff at Georgia, Virginia, and Washington & Lee, notably
Rodney Smolla, Brian Murchison, A. Benjamin Spencer, and Madelyn Wessel
without whom my academic enterprises would be impossible. All opinions voiced
are my own.
1. See CDC, HIV AND AIDS-UNITED STATES, 1981-2000, 50 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 430 (2001), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5021a2.htm ("AIDS incidence
increased rapidly through the 1980s, peaked in the early 1990s, and then
declined."); see also, e.g., Philip M. Boffey, Surgeon General Urges Frank Talk to
Young on AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1986, at A24 (describing the federal
government's first major report on stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS and
projections of future transmission rates).
2. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (5-4 decision) (finding no
federal constitutional right to same-sex sexual relations), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. "Sexual minorities" includes all non-heterosexual persons and is
conterminal with the term "LGBT" which includes lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender persons.
4. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
5. The challenged Colorado state constitutional provision, commonly referred
to as Amendment 2, reads:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
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legislation on the state and local level.' The Romer Court
effectively ruled that a class of citizens distinguishable by their
constitutionally unprotected and often criminalized7 conduct had a
right to be free of invidious government discrimination For
lawyers, whose very entrance into the profession relies on a test of
logic,9 such inconsistencies are surely confounding.
There were also significant favorable shifts in demeanor
towards sexual minorities on the individual level. Justice
O'Connor voted with the Bowers majority that the criminalization
of same-sex sexual conduct met constitutional muster,o yet voted
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section
of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, invalidated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
6. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 ("[Amendment 21 seems inexplicable by anything
but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests.").
7. At the time Romer was decided in 1996, same-sex sodomy was still
proscribed in twenty-three states including: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAW IN AMERICA 1861-2003, at
388-407 (2008).
8. Justice Scalia in his dissent noted this logical inconsistency in Romer. "If it
is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal,
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely
disfavoring homosexual conduct." Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also posited in a 1987 rejection of
a sexual orientation discrimination claim that:
If the [Bowers] Court was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize
the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open . . . to conclude that
state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious. After all,
there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than
making the conduct that defines the class criminal.
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Members of the academy
have also pointed out the incongruence of Bowers and Romer. For example, one
scholar argues:
According to Bowers, gays and lesbians can rightly be stigmatized as
criminals. But of course many provisions, thought to be constitutional,
disadvantage criminals in the political process. Take, for example, the laws
on the books in many states that remove the vote from convicted felons. If
gays are or can legally be made criminals, can't they be treated unequally
in the political process?
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY 105 (2010).
9. See Law School Admissions Council, About the LSAT,
http://www.1sac.org/JD/LSAT/about-the-LSAT.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2012)
(noting the logical skills testing component of the Law School Admissions Test).
10. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986).
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with the Romer majority." O'Connor again somewhat dodged her
1986 vote in Lawrence v. Texas.12 There, she opined that while
there is no fundamental constitutional right to sodomy, a law
banning only same-sex sodomy could not survive Equal Protection
scrutiny." Justice Lewis Powell, uneasy with his majority vote in
Bowers from the very beginning," publicly voiced regret over it in
1990.15
The pro-gay rights trajectory of the 1990s was not limited to
federal courts. Between 1986 and 1998, numerous state courts
invalidated anti-sodomy laws under their respective constitutions
and rejected Bowers. In 1992, the Kentucky Supreme Court was
the first court of last resort to invalidate a state sodomy statute
under state constitutional grounds after Bowers." Between 1992
and 2002, five additional state high courts followed Kentucky's
lead." Notably, these courts declined to extend Bowers
notwithstanding widespread public opposition to homosexuality.
11. Romer, 517 U.S. at 621.
12. 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). There is some level of irony worth teasing out
about Lawrence. One petitioner, John Geddes Lawrence, was White. His
codefendant, Tyron Garner, was Black. Neither was affluent. Thus, there is some
irony that interracial sexual partners of lesser means lead the path towards
achieving a pivotal legal victory for a community that is often portrayed as more
White and affluent than the general population. See Dale Carpenter, The
Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464, 1502-03 (2004)
(exploring the possible racial dynamics of the initial arrest and prosecution of
Lawrence and Garner).
13. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote:
The Court today overrules Bowers v. Hardwick. I joined Bowers, and do
not join the Court in overruling it. Nevertheless, I agree with the Court
that Texas' statute banning same-sex sodomy is unconstitutional. Rather
than relying on the substantive component of the Fourteenth
Amendments Due Process Clause, as the Court does, I base my conclusion
on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
Unlike the Texas statute in Lawrence, the 1986 Georgia statute proscribed sodomy
for heterosexual and homosexual couples, creating distinguishable issues in
Lawrence not present in Bowers. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a)(1) (1986) ("A
person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another."),
invalidated by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14. JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 522
(1994).
15. Id. at 530 (quoting Justice Powell on Bowers, "I think I probably made a
mistake in that one.").
16. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 500 (Ky. 1992).
17. Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353-54 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 270
Ga. 327, 336 (1998); Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders v. Att'y Gen., 436 Mass.
132, 133 (2002); Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 456 (1997); Campbell v.
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
18. Gallup polls revealed that as late as 1998, less than forty percent of
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The development of sexual minority rights jurisprudence on
the state and federal level suggests that something significant
helped usher in a watershed era of unparalleled success for sexual
minority litigants in the early 1990s. While these post-Bowers
decisions were undoubtedly correct in their outcome, there is little
explanation in academic literature for the timing and manner in
which they came about."
There is, however, a framework of analysis originally
proffered by the civil rights academic and critical race theory
pioneer, Professor Derrick Bell, which can help explain the logical
inconsistencies between Bowers and Romer. Professor Bell tackled
the great unanswered question about the timing and substance of
Brown v. Board of Education": what caused the Court in 1954 to
profoundly depart from the "separate but equal" doctrine at a time
when desegregation was widely opposed by the public?"
Professor Bell's answer was a new theory of interest-
convergence." Bell wrote:
Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before
and after Brown, this principle of "interest convergence"
provides: The interest of [B]lacks in achieving racial equality
will be accommodated only when it converges with the
interests of [Wihites. However, the fourteenth amendment,
standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing
effective racial equality for [B]lacks where the remedy sought
threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper
class [Wihites.2
Using this theoretical framework, Professor Bell posited that
the Brown decision was a reverberation of overriding national
security and international relations concerns and "not the Court's
sudden awakening of a long-dormant morality with respect to the
subjugation of Blacks."2
respondents found homosexuality acceptable and substantially less than fifty
percent supported legalization of same-sex conduct. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at
267.
19. See infra text accompanying note 27.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated public schools violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
21. Southern states successfully fought federal efforts to integrate public
schools until the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-
157 (2008) (analyzing the implementation of Brown v. Board of Education to
desegregate public schools).
22. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
23. Id. at 523.
24. Id. at 524-25.
25. Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 Nw. U. L.
120 [Vol. 31:117
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Academics have applied the interest-convergence theory to a
host of legal contexts. As Professor Justin Driver notes, "Among
the extremely broad range of issues that scholars believe the
interest-convergence theory can remedy or illuminate are the
following: educational reform, pension reform, animal rights,
domestic violence, concentrated poverty, and even the war on
terror."26
Academics have not squarely applied the theory, however, to
sexual orientation and the sexual minority rights movement."
Professor Kenji Yoshino applied a variant of the theory to sexual
minorities' rights in a 2008 New York Times Magazine piece where
he argued, "If more straights could come to see marriage as a
universal right that belongs to all human beings, that would,
indeed, be a convergence of interest.""
A slightly modified framing of interest-convergence theory, if
applied to the sexual minority rights movement, can illuminate
the timing and motivation behind the movement's earliest and
continued successes: sexual minorities' Fourteenth Amendment
challenges will be successful provided the LGBT community's
REV. 149, 162 (2011).
26. Id. at 155.
27. To date, Westlaw and Lexis searches indicate no journal articles that
squarely address sexual orientation and interest-convergence theory. The only
scholarship that glosses over a connection between rights for sexual minorities and
interest-convergence theory is Professor Victor Romero's single sentence suggesting
that interest-convergence theory does not explain the expansion of all minority
rights. Victor C. Romero, Immigrant Education and the Promise of Integrative
Egalitarianism, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 275, 295 (2011) ("[Tihere might be a
different explanation for minorities' gains apart from interest convergence that
becomes apparent by examining the Court's recent gay rights jurisprudence.").
This is not to suggest that quality, meaningful work published in highly regarded
journals addressing the portrayal, or non-portrayal, of intersectional identities in
political movements has not been done. Indeed, Professor Jane Schacter, Professor
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, and others time and again illuminate the misguided
and widely held perceptions of the sexual minority community that inform the
underpinnings of this Article. However, none of them apply interest-convergence
theory nor did those prior scholarly works have the benefit of recent pro-LGBT
rights decisions. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the
States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283
(1994) (published two years prior to Romer v. Evans); Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
"Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection
Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358 (2000) (published three years prior to
Lawrence v. Texas and the first state same-sex marriage decision, Goodridge v.
Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)). Marc Fajer, too, hinted at
problems arising from interest divergence. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men
Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection
for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 633-51 (1992) (arguing,
conversely, after Bowers but before Romer that social stereotypes might negatively
impact the outcome of gay and lesbian equality litigation).
28. Kenji Yoshino, Marriage Partners, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 1, 2008, at 26.
1212012]
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interests converge with White heterosexual elites' and the remedy
sought does not threaten heteronormative superiority or
heteronormative institutions.
This thesis can help explain why, despite widespread public
opposition to homosexuality and rights for same-sex couples,29
courts favored sexual minority plaintiffs in greater numbers
throughout the mid-1990s and 2000s.
Racialized and socioeconomic arguments formulated by anti-
gay rights groups in the early 1990s dominated the politics of the
contemporary movement and established the framework in which
gay rights opponents approached constitutional litigation."o
Opponents' propagation of a falsehood that non-heterosexuals
were White, wealthy, educated, urban elites seeking special, elitist
rights, did not slow the movement. Rather, the racial and class-
based attacks shifted the tenor of litigation. The focal point of
judges veered away from the types of arguments prevalent in the
1970s and 1980s that linked homosexuality with predatory sexual
deviancy, to arguments on "homosexual elitism.""
Once these arguments of White privilege were coupled with
LGBT activists' efforts to seek equality through whitewashed and
heteronormative institutions, e.g., marriage and the military,' in
the 1990s, the interests of the LGBT community and judicial
decision makers further aligned. Thus, anti-gay forces ironically
helped pave the way for judicial expansion" of sexual minority
29. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 267.
30. See COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, EQUAL RIGHTS-NOT SPECIAL
RIGHTS! (1992), reprinted in Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 167, 191-99 (1997); Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice Family
Life Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
31. New York Times columnist Frank Bruni recently illustrated this concept
particularly well when he wrote, "It's funny (but, then again, not): in the past,
homosexuals were denounced as sexual libertines who brazenly flouted society's
norms. Now many of us are pleading to be yoked to those norms, only to be told by
many Americans, including many political leaders, that that's not O.K. either."
Frank Bruni, Op-Ed., Value Our Families, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012, at A25.
32. See infra Part I.E for broader discussion on the relationship between
marriage, military service, and constructions of Whiteness; see also RALPH RICHARD
BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? (2011) (describing the intersection of
legal, social, and media constructions of marriage and decreasing marriage rates
among the African-American community); GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE
INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS
70-104 (2006) (addressing the intersection of White privilege and military service).
33. While the expansion is best evident in federal courts, the interest-
convergence theory can help explain some of the pro-sexual minorities' rights
decisions in state courts. While some may suggest state court decisions post-
Bowers that were not favorable for sexual minorities undermine the theory, the
theory is best applied to federal courts. This is because Article III judges, by virtue
122 [Vol. 31:117
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rights and still, notably, without popular backing.'
Litigation participants in the 1990s began to ask judges to
view sexual minorities as a subset of a White, politically potent,
elite class, who "looked" and "sounded" like them." The result was
a newly realized "shared" identity that rendered the interests of
White elites, jurists, and sexual minorities virtually
indistinguishable. The stage was now set for positive dispositions
of LGBT constitutional claims. Shared identity alone, however, is
not sufficient for litigation success. Judges will not authorize
remedies against sexual minority inequality if those remedies
undermine the established heteronormative power hierarchy.
State marriage equality legislation, changes in military
policy, and non-domestic policy developments ensure that sexual
minorities and elite interests will remain converged and that
36heteronormative power norms are not substantially challenged.
Success on constitutional claims will continue if judges perceive
sexual minorities as not only innocuous to heterosexuals but as
allies seeking to exercise their rightful noblesse oblige within
whitewashed social institutions."
However, the fiction of gay privilege is not uniformly
advantageous to the sexual minority community-which is
demographically representative of the population as a whole.
of having life tenure during good behavior, are not subject to popular will to retain
their position, thus theoretically eliminating public opinion as a confounding
variable.
34. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 267.
35. See, e.g., Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice Family Life
Project as Amicus Curiae, supra note 30, at 10-11.
36. By heteronormative power norms I intend to capture the interests and
traditions of heterosexuals who historically hold positions of influence and power.
These interests can be broadly grouped into three categories: religious, fraternal,
and national security. Religious interests are closely tied to organized religion and
religious leaders, fraternal interests relate to private organizational interests like
the Boy Scouts, Free Masons, or the Knights of Columbus, and national security
interests include military and diplomatic affairs-a public policy arena often
associated with heterosexual males.
37. Literature suggests that there are internal elements of racial prejudice
within the LGBT community. See, e.g., ROBERT STAPLES, EXPLORING BLACK
SEXUALITY 62 (2006) (highlighting accusations of racial prejudice within the LGBT
community social circles). Studies in sociological and psychological literature have
hypothesized and/or demonstrated with empirical evidence that internalized racial
prejudices exist among LGB Whites. See Margaret Rosario et al., Ethnic/Racial
Differences in the Coming-Out Process of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youths: A
Comparison of Sexual Identity Development Over Time, 10 CULTURAL DIVERSITY &
ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 215, 217-18 (2004), available at
http://digilib.bc.edu/reserves/py528/cher/py52820.pdf (summarizing the
hypothetical and empirical findings regarding internal racial prejudice among LGB
Whites).
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While interest-convergence theory predicts favorable outcomes for
sexual minorities on constitutional claims, regardless of the level
of scrutiny applied, the salient gay privilege myth is a roadblock to
securing long-term discretionary statutory protections and
benefits.
I. From Moral Panic to Unrestrained White Privilege
The years immediately preceding the Bowers and Romer
decisions saw dramatically different rhetorical tactics utilized by
opponents of sexual minority rights. The 1977 Save Our Children
campaign and the 1992 battle over Amendment 2 in Colorado are
highly informative case studies that illustrate the shift in gay
rights rhetoric between the 1970s and 1990s.
A. The Citrus Queen's Warpath
The first large scale effort to repeal pro-sexual minority
rights legislation came out of Dade County, Florida in 1977.
Earlier that year, the Dade County Commission passed a county
ordinance prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in county or municipal employment.38 Florida
Citrus Fruit spokeswoman, musician, and former Miss Oklahoma
Anita Bryant waged a large-scale assault against the
nondiscrimination provision." Her campaign, strategically
entitled Save Our Children, successfully led efforts against the
ordinance. Bryant's campaign forced a referendum that repealed
the ordinance by a two-to-one margin."
Professor William Eskridge recently summarized the Save
Our Children Campaign's tactical approach:
The Save Our Children model for antigay politics combined (1)
appeals to Scripture and religious authority demonizing
homosexuality as an "abomination" in the eyes of God, with (2)
baseless stereotypes about homosexual men as predatory, sex-
crazed, diseased, and hedonistic, and (3) concerns that "special
rights" for these immoral, selfish, and predatory people would
invade constitutional rights and liberties of God-fearing people
and their vulnerable children.4
38. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE?: THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY'S
DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 38 (2004).
39. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah's Curse: How Religion Often Conflates
Status, Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657,
694 (2011); see also ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIVAL OF
OUR NATION'S FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY (1977)
(articulating Anita Bryant's perspective on the Save Our Children campaign).




Anita Bryant's widespread media blitz included propaganda
that labeled sexual minorities as predatory sexual deviants.
Bryant suggested that sexual minorities actively sought to prey on
children and lure them into a homosexual lifestyle. Bryant
famously proclaimed, "This recruitment of our children is
absolutely necessary for the survival and growth of
homosexuality-for since homosexuals cannot reproduce, they
must recruit, must freshen their ranks."' Save Our Children's
message was communicated to large audiences in Southern
Florida, including a full-page newspaper advertisement in the
Miami Herald that dramatically headlined "There is No 'Human
Right' to Corrupt Our Children," and described non-heterosexuals
as pedophiles who preyed upon, molested, and targeted children."
The predatory-deviant rhetoric was not quarantined in
Southern Florida. Readers of the New York Times,5 The
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,46 The Star-News of Wilmington, North
Carolina," and Oregon's Eugene Register-Guard,' for example,
could see the Save Our Children Campaign line of argumentation
grace the pages of their local newspapers. Conservative
syndicated columnist William Safire used his platform to
nationally diffuse the predatory portrayal of LGBT people
endorsed by Bryant and her allies. "If avowed gays were to be
teachers, the example they would set to children might induce
some toward emulation of their abnormality, which society wants
to discourage," he wrote.
Others involved in the anti-gay movement depicted non-
heterosexuals as violent thugs. Jerry Falwell told a Miami crowd
that non-heterosexuals are "a vile and vicious and vulgar gang.
They'd kill you as quick as look at you.""
Anita Bryant and Jerry Falwell used fear to drum up support
42. There is No "Human Right" to Corrupt Our Children, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
20, 1977, at B-7.
43. BRYANT, supra note 39, at 146.
44. There is No "Human Right" to Corrupt Our Children, supra note 42, at B-7.
45. William Safire, Editorial, Now Ease Up, Anita, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 9, 1977, at
21.
46. William Safire, Editorial, Anita Can Ease Up on Battle, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Jun. 11, 1977, at 6.
47. William Safire, Editorial, Okay, Now Ease Up, Anita, STAR-NEWS, Jun. 12,
1977, at 2-D.
48. William Safire, Editorial, Miami Gay Activists Asked for Too Much, EUGENE
REG.-GUARD, Jun. 9, 1977, at 19A.
49. Id.
50. FRED FEJES, GAY RIGHTS AND MORAL PANIC: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S
DEBATE ON HOMOSEXUALITY 134 (2008).
2012]1 125
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for their cause. But anti-gay activists also tapped into the politics
of disgust. Bryant once warned that to grant rights to non-
heterosexuals would lead to protections for those who engage in
bestiality. Bryant said, "If gays are granted rights, next we'll have
to give rights to prostitutes and to people who sleep with St.
Bernards."'l
The Save Our Children Campaign expanded to repeal
nondiscrimination ordinances outside Florida. The inflammatory
rhetoric used in Florida did not cool elsewhere. Indeed, one
religious leader who headed efforts to stave off a 1978 sexual
orientation nondiscrimination law in St. Paul, Minnesota claimed,
"Homosexuality is a murderous, horrendous, twisted act. It is a sin
and a powerful, addictive lust."52 In Wichita, Kansas, activists
distributed pamphlets suggesting that nondiscrimination laws for
sexual minorities could turn communities into red light districts."
The campaigns of the late 1970s did not capitalize on
depictions of non-heterosexuals as wealthy, well-educated, White
elites. Though the "special rights" component of the anti-sexual
minority political forces issue framing existed, those issues were
mere subtext to the more dangerous depictions of sexual
minorities as Biblically condemned, sexually predatory, social
degenerates." If the medical and scientific community evolved on
sexual orientation by demonstrating homosexuality was not
abnormal, immutable, or otherwise non-volitional, sexual minority
rights opponents would need something more than anti-
51. NANCY J. KNAUER, GAY AND LESBIAN ELDERS: HISTORY, LAW, AND IDENTITY
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (2011).
52. DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE
TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 327 (Touchstone ed., Simon &
Schuster 2001) (1999).
53. Voting Against Gay Rights, TIME MAG., May 22, 1978, at 21 ("'Our
community could become a haven for practicing homosexuals, lesbians, prostitutes
and pimps,' said one pamphlet distributed by the Concerned Citizens for
Community Standards of Wichita, Kans."). Save Our Children Campaign was also
associated with the 1978 California gubernatorial candidate John Briggs's
initiative in California, which, had it been adopted by voters, would have mandated
the termination of openly gay public school teachers. See CHRIS BULL & JOHN
GALLAGHER, PERFECT ENEMIES: THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND
THE GAY MOVEMENT 18 (2001). This garnered national attention in part due to
then-Governor Ronald Reagan's opposition. See Ronald Reagan, Editorial, Two Ill-
advised California Trends, L.A. HERALD EXAM'R, Nov. 1, 1978, at A-19 (arguing
that banning "advocacy" of the gay lifestyle was too vague).
54. See, e.g., Max Rafferty, Joining the Bryant Brigade, reprinted in BRYANT,
supra note 39, at 141 (advocating in the Los Angeles Times for readers to join the
"Bryant Brigade" because homosexuals are "spiritually isolated from the deepest




homophobic vitriol. Similarly, if the LGBT community abandoned
its liberationist ambitions for assimilationist ones, anti-rights
groups would need to counter with new strategies. As history
would have it, both of these came to fruition.5 ' Anita Bryant and
the Save Our Children Campaign laid the groundwork for the next
phase: the special rights argument. But the special rights
argument alone was not sufficient-it was time to divide and
conquer. And so the special rights argument was married with
racial and class based identity politics.
B. The Wooing of Justice Powell
In June 1986, the Supreme Court handed down Bowers,
finding no right to homosexual sodomy.' The very same year,
notably, the virus that causes AIDS was first named HIV and the
Surgeon General issued a report on the HIV/AIDS epidemic for the
first time." Some scholars have argued that the HIV/AIDS crisis
informed and influenced the majority's decision in Bowers even
though the Court did not support its position with any public
health justification.59
These theories are not without merit. There is some extra-
opinion support for the HIV/AIDS thesis. Justice O'Connor, for
example, at the closure of oral argument hinted at the public
health implications of anti-sodomy statutes like the challenged
Georgia law, but did not make any specific mention of HIV or
55. In 1973, the American Psychological Association removed homosexuality
from its status as a mental illness. BULL & GALLAGHER, supra note 53, at 28; see
American Psychological Association, Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council
of Representatives, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 620, 633 (1975). That same year, the
American Psychiatric Association wrote homosexiality out of its Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, and stated that homosexuality "implies no impairment in
judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities."
American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on Homosexuality and Civil
Rights (1973), reprinted in 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 497, 497 (1974).
56. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
57. See STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS
OF KNOWLEDGE 77 (1996) ("In response to the confusing array of acronyms then in
use-HTVL-III, LAV, ARV, HTLV-III/LAV, and others-the Human Retrovirus
Subcommittee of the International Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses ...
agreed on a new, compromise, name in 1986: HIV, human immunodeficiency
virus.").
58. See Boffey, supra note 1, at A24.
59. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of
Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L. J. 333, 338
n.25 (1992) ("Posner notes that AIDS was discussed in the [Bowers] briefs . . . and
is widely believed to have had some influence on the Justices who formed the
majority."); Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV.
359, 462-71 (2001) (summarizing the possible role the HIV/AIDS crisis may have
played in the Bowers decision).
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AIDS.60 Briefs from the American Psychological Association and
the Georgia Attorney General squarely addressed the relationship
between anti-sodomy statutes, HIV/AIDS, and public health."
It would be disingenuous to discount fully the possibility that
the public health environment may have played a part of the
Bowers Court's decision-making process. However, the private
memoranda circulated among the members of the Court do not
suggest that public health considerations played a critical role.'
The most important of these memoranda does, however,
unabashedly toe the Anita Bryant deviancy line.
Bowers required the Supreme Court to answer whether a
right to engage in same-sex relations was enshrined in the
Constitution. Justice Powell was uneasy finding a substantive
right to homosexual conduct.' He was equally hesitant to side
with the eventual majority. Instead, Powell searched for an
Eighth Amendment theory to invalidate Respondent Hardwick's
sodomy conviction as cruel and unusual punishment.6 He
considered treating sexual orientation as a status akin to drug
60. See Spindelman, supra note 59, at 468-69.
61. See Brief of American Psychological Ass'n & American Public Health Ass'n
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (No. 85-140) ("Based on scientific and clinical data, amici also
respectfully submit that the Georgia statute does not further individual mental
health or the public health. Indeed, in several ways, the statute actually disserves
these goals."). Conversely, the brief submitted by the Attorney General of Georgia
articulated a public health argument that made one mention of the AIDS epidemic
couched within language articulating a predatory depiction of homosexuals. Brief
of Michael J. Bowers for the Petitioners, at 37, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (No. 85-140). The document stated:
[Tihe legislature should be permitted to draw conclusions concerning the
relationship of homosexual sodomy in the transmission of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and other diseases such as anorectal
gonorrhea, Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, enteric protozoal diseases, and
Cytomegalovirus, and the concomitant effects of this relationship on the
general public health and welfare.
The AIDS argument may not have been given undue emphasis because Georgia
first proscribed sodomy many years before the epidemic in 1867. Bowers, 478 U.S.
at 193 n.6 (citing GA. CODE §§ 4286, 4287, 4290 (1867)).
62. See The Burger Court Opinion Database: Bowers v. Hardwick [hereinafter
Bowers Memoranda], http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edulfiles/opinion-pdfs
/1985/85-140.pdf (last visited Sep. 22, 2012) (making no reference to the health
concerns).
63. Memorandum from Justice Lewis Powell to United States Supreme Court
Justices, Apr. 8, 1986, Bowers Memoranda, supra note 62 ("I may say generally,
that I also hesitate to create another substantive due process right.").
64. Id. ("At Conference last week, I expressed the view that in some cases it
would violate the Eighth Amendment to imprison a person for a private act of
homosexual sodomy. I continue to think that in such cases imprisonment would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.").
128 [Vol. 31:117
GAY GENTRIFICATION
addiction.' Justice Powell laid out these concerns and his
theoretical approaches to an evenly divided conference."
Chief Justice Burger sent Justice Powell a private
memorandum to disabuse Justice Powell of his inclination to apply
the Eighth Amendment and convince the Virginian to join the
eventual majority opinion as its fifth vote." Burger's private plea
echoed the Save Our Children era rhetoric.
Burger first addressed Powell's flirtation with analyzing anti-
sodomy statutes as status crimes that contravened the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.'
Burger wrote, "even if homosexuality is somehow conditioned, the
decision to commit an act of sodomy is a choice, pure and simple-
maybe not so pure!"69
Burger then took Powell's status theory and threw sexual
minorities into the same lot as degenerates and drug addicts, "We
can only speculate as to why Hardwick did not make this
particular argument that you advance [that there might be an
Eighth Amendment violation]. Maybe Hardwick did not want to
become subject to 'compulsory treatment programs' that are
prescribed for 'helpless' people like narcotics addicts."0
Burger told Powell that homosexuals seeking their own "form
of sexual gratification" are not unlike "those in society who wish
[to] seek gratification through incest, drug use, gambling,
exhibitionism, prostitution, rape, and what not . . . ." and should
be treated like any other group claiming a right to engage in
"prohibited acts.""
Burger, with subtlety, invoked the predatory language of the
anti-LGBT rights campaigns of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Burger warned Powell that finding a right to engage in
65. Id. Justice Powell wanted to fashion his opinion in the mold of Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), which held that imprisonment resulting from a
misdemeanor conviction for one's status as drug addict violated the Eighth
Amendment. While Justice Powell's proposed disposition of the case was
substantially better for Hardwick, it nevertheless would have placed homosexuality
among a class of societal degenerates. The Anita Bryant, social deviant paradigm
of the LGBT community colored even the best of Justice Powell's intentions.
66. Id. ("[M]y vote was to affirm [on Eighth Amendment grounds] rather than
the view of four other Justices that there was a violation of a fundamental right.").
67. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell, Apr. 3, 1986,
Bowers Memoranda, supra note 62 (labeled as "Personal").
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
69. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, Apr. 3, 1986, Bowers Memoranda, supra note 62.




homosexual sodomy "would forbid the states from adopting any
sort of policy that would exclude homosexuals from class rooms
[sic] or state-sponsored boys' clubs and Boy Scout adult
leadership.""
The Chief was successful. Justice Powell announced his
decision to provide the final vote necessary to cement a majority
five days after the Chiefs personal memorandum.7 ' A mere four
years later, Justice Powell backpedaled from his vote.7 ' But, more
importantly, after 1986 the Burger-Bryant logic would never gain
traction with the Court again.
C. Special Rights and the Colorado Constitution
In 1992, a statewide effort to repeal a scattering of local
nondiscrimination ordinances protecting sexual minorities in
Denver, Aspen, Boulder, and elsewhere began in Colorado." That
effort sought to repeal those ordinances through a voter-approved
constitutional amendment, known as Amendment 2, to the
Colorado Constitution eliminating all protections for sexual
orientation discrimination."
Colorado for Family Values and other supporters of
Amendment 2's strategy retained the deviant-oriented arguments
of the Save Our Children era and heavily overlaid them with overt
attempts to segregate sexual minorities as a rich, White
phenomenon that unfairly sought "special rights."" This
depiction, or orientation abstraction, 8 took great strides to depict
72. Id. It is worth highlighting that Chief Justice Burger's concerns were
cabined to predatory homosexual males.
73. Justice Powell's announcement was dated April 8, 1986. See Memorandum
from Justice Powell, supra note 63. Chief Justice Burger's personal memorandum
to Justice Powell was dated April 3, 1986. See Memorandum from Chief Justice
Burger, supra note 69.
74. See JEFFRIES, supra note 14, at 530 (talking about his Bowers vote, Powell
conceded in a lecture in 1990 that he "probably made a mistake . . .
75. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996).
76. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, invalidated by Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
77. COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, supra note 30, at 191.
78. Professor Jane S. Schacter first developed this concept. See Schacter, supra
note 27, at 313. The concept, as employed in this Article, suggests that since not all
sexual minorities are known to the general public or readily identifiable by physical
characteristics, individuals who seek to frame sexual minorities as dominantly
coming from a certain racial or social background can do so with relative ease by
abstracting anecdotal vignettes and purporting that anecdotal evidence to be
representative of the "defined" class. For sexual orientation, abstraction that
depicts sexual minorities as wealthy and White may be easier to sell to the general
public because vocal proponents of LGBT rights might likely be wealthier and
Whiter than the population as a whole. This assumption stems from the theory
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civil rights protections as a zero-sum game: rights for non-
heterosexuals threatened the civil rights of all." This was
particularly true, pro-Amendment 2 surrogates argued, for the
African-American community.
The zero-sum game theme was not only prominent in
campaign literature,"o but was also embedded within the text of
Amendment 2. Amendment 2 banned sexual minorities from
enjoying "quota preferences,"" alluding to affirmative action
programs that operated on strict racial quotas.82 Amendment 2's
quota preference prohibition reinforced the idea that if protections
are afforded to sexual minorities it will necessarily come at the
expense of some other group. Amendment supporters' quid pro
quo message was tailored for non-White audiences. If sexual
minorities received quota benefits, according to anti-gay groups'
that those with greater wealth or who face greater societal discrimination due to
plainly obvious physical attributes (i.e., race and sex) will face more barriers to
openly expressing their sexual identity and assuming great personal risk by
engaging in pro-LGBT political activities. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
"Claiming" and "Speaking" Who We Are, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND
SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 37 (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999) ("[There is a]
virulent homophobia and racism of American society and [a] heterosexist
construction of racial identity.. . . Coming out and being Black, in a world of racial
and sexual hierarchy requires both courage and privilege. Thus, it is not surprising
that many Black gays and lesbians choose to remain silent about their sexuality ...
."); Hutchinson, supra note 27, at 1384. Hutchinson notes:
The debilitating effects of intertwined poverty, racism, patriarchy, and
heterosexism render the most vulnerable members of the gay and lesbian
population less visible; gay and lesbian activism and legal advocacy are
dominated by privileged individuals who have historically failed to
comprehend, challenge, or feel concern for the subordination endured by
less powerful gays and lesbians; and racism, sexism, and class
insensitivity plague gay and lesbian theory and activism.
Id. Rosario et al., supra note 37, at 217-18 (explaining that a lack of participation
among non-White males in gay organizations may be attributable to internal racial
prejudices held by LGB Whites while also noting that the same lack of participation
does not hold in lesbian social activities).
79. This approach would resurface with vigor in the early legal and legislative
struggles to enact marriage equality. See infra Part III.
80. This tactic was perhaps employed because polling data suggested it might
prove the most effective. See Amy L. Stone & Jane Ward, From "Black People are
Not a Homosexual Act" to "Gay is the New Black". Mapping White Uses of Blackness
in Modern Gay Rights Campaigns in the United States, 17 SOC. IDENTITIES 605,
617 (2011) ("[Plolls repeatedly indicated that Black voters were more supportive of
eliminating discrimination than providing equal rights for gays and lesbians.").
81. COLO. CONST. art. II, invalidated by Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Similar language was presented twice to Oregon voters in 1992 and 1994. See Brief
of Oregon Citizens Alliance, No Special Rights Committee and Stop Special Rights-
Pac as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (No. 94-1039).
82. The United States Supreme Court expressly prohibited quota-based
affirmative action programs in the public sector fourteen years earlier. See Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-17 (1978).
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logic, White, wealthy individuals would benefit and displace non-
Whites from attaining preference for educational admission or
government contracts--one-for-one.
These types of arguments were plainly articulated in
campaign literature. Colorado for Family Values published a
tabloid blasting arguments supporting sexual orientation
nondiscrimination laws. That publication, EQUAL RIGHTS-
NOT SPECIAL RIGHTS!,' opened up with quotations from
purported civil rights experts:
"If we include a group of people who are generally identified as
a deviant group sexually, it would erode, and seriously damage
the legitimate civil rights protections that have been gained by
ethnic minorities."84
"I don't see gay ghettos. I don't see the gay homeless. I don't
see the gays being disadvantaged politically or economically. I
don't think that they are in the same class as the traditional
minority groups, Hispanic or Indian women."8
"Making sexual preference a protected class does a disservice
to all those people presently being discriminated against or
mistreated, by diluting the significance of civil rights
protection. I hate to see resources taken away from those who
are truly in need of protection.""
Amendment 2 proponents supported their position by
arguing that non-heterosexuals did not need nondiscrimination
protections, unlike racial minorities, because there was no
outward evidence of disadvantage." They further suggested that
non-heterosexuals' calls for nondiscrimination protections were not
just unnecessary, they were greedy and unprincipled." The Equal
Rights-Not Special Rights pamphlet, for example, told voters that
members of the gay community had an "average income ... more
than $30,000 over that of the average" American." The campaign
piece stated that gays were "over three times more likely to be
college graduates,""0 and, perhaps as a result, "[tlhree times as
83. See COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, supra note 30.
84. Id. at 192 (quoting Ignacio Rodriguez, former chairman of the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission).
85. Id. (quoting Tom Duran, a "(wlell-known state civil rights professional").
86. Id. (quoting John Franklin, former chairman of the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission).
87. This was not limited to Colorado. Proponents of a similar measure in
Oregon touted comparable logic, arguing for a constitutional amendment that
would prohibit the state from any action that would "advise or teach children,
students, employees that homosexuality equates legally or socially with race, other
protected classifications." Schacter, supra note 27, at 290 n.47.





likely to hold professional or managerial positions."9' After
detailing all the supposed economic advantages the gay
community enjoyed, the literature concluded its sketch of gay
individuals stating that they were "[flour times as likely to be
overseas travelers" than heterosexuals.92 A reasonable reader
could easily surmise that since gay people enjoyed such a
privileged, well-to-do lifestyle, their claims to need protections
from discrimination were no more than crying wolf. These
statistics could not be further from the truth-both in reality and
pure republication accuracy.
First, Amendment 2 proponents distorted the data from a
Simmons Market Research survey supposedly published in the
Wall Street Journal in 1991 that the proponents purported to
cite.93 As it happens, no such survey appeared in the Wall Street
Journal in 1991,94 but the cited data resembled that of an oft-
quoted study that actually reported that, of the gay and lesbian
respondents, the average" income was $36,000." The median
income for American men working non-seasonal, full-time jobs was
$27,342 per year." The alleged heterosexual-homosexual income
disparity was clearly not "more than $30,000" as Colorado for
Family Values told voters." The "difference" was slightly over
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, supra note 30, at 192.
94. Id. The tabloid cites a July 18, 1991 article published in the Wall -Street
Journal. However, that article makes no mention of a marketing survey. The
Journal had, however, cited two Simmons Market Research Bureau surveys in
1988 and 1989. See Dennis Kneale, Folks at CBS Should Have Bet the Ranch on
'Lonesome Dove,' WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1988, at B3; Ronald Alsop, Advertisers
Retreat From Making Direct Pitch to the Gay Market, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1988, at
39.
95. The use of average is also suspect here. The mean of LGBT respondents'
income is much more likely to be manipulated because it is more susceptible to
outlier data. The median is a more descriptive statistic to use. In calculating the
mean, the sum of all values is divided by the number of values, which result may be
skewed high if there are several "off-the-charts" data points, or low if there is a
large cluster of data at the bottom of the list. In other words, if the data is not
symmetrically distributed, the mean may be a misleading indicator. In such cases,
the median is more descriptive because it is precisely the middle value of all values
when sorted in ascending order; by definition, fifty percent of all values will be
above the median and fifty percent will be below. The median is thus the more
reliable "average" of asymmetrical data.
96. Kneale, supra note 94, at B3.
97. M.V. LEE BADGETT, MYTHS, MONEY, AND CHANGE 23 (2001).
98. COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, supra note 30, at 192. It is possible that
the tabloid misleadingly compared average household income to per-capita income
in order to get to the $30,000 figure. The average gay respondent's household
income, according to the 1988 survey, was $47,800 compared to the 1989 surveys




Even if these numbers were accurately republished,
problematic data collection methods caution against use of the
findings. The cited survey only solicited responses from readers of
LGBT-oriented newspapers and magazines. This almost ensures a
skewed sample that is not truly random and unlikely to represent
the population as a whole. As Professor M.V. Lee Badgett notes,
"It is well known that readers of magazines and newspapers tend
to be better educated and have higher incomes and are, therefore,
not representative of the larger society.""
Additionally there is a problem of self-identification. It is
difficult to imagine someone who wishes to conceal his or her
sexual orientation or who has not fully accepted his or her sexual
orientation subscribing to LGBT publications in 1991. Self-
identified sexual minorities are merely a subset of the sexual
minority population-and readers of LGBT periodicals are a
subset of that sub-population. While to offer these statistics as
either representative of the population or as incontrovertible truth
was disingenuous, this survey and others like it were routinely
used to support the illusion of gay wealth.'0'
But this was only the beginning-the pamphlet brazenly
employed racialized rhetoric. Another section of the pamphlet
headlined, "Sound like an oppressed minority to you? Judge for
yourself-Take a look at the hardships Black Americans have had
to face. Then see if homosexuals compare. Special rights for
homosexuals just isn't fair-especially to disadvantaged minorities
in Colorado."'
The pamphlet included a chart under the headline with six
categories relating to voting rights, de jure segregation, de facto
segregation (both past and present), and economic detriment
resulting from systematic discrimination.'" In the horizontal
columns next to it, there were two categories: "Homosexuals" and
"Black Americans."04 The pamphlet assessed each category with a
"yes" or a "no," indicating that non-heterosexuals had suffered no
such impediments while African Americans had in every
99. This is the difference between the purported mean income of the LGBT
community and the reported median income for American males during the same
time period. Id.
100. BADGETT, supra note 97, at 25.
101. Id.





enumerated category.o' Though substantively untrue, the most
notable aspect of the chart is the message it does not expressly
convey-that sexual minorities and African Americans are
mutually exclusive groups. The racial-sexual orientation binary,
taken together with prior argumentation related to allegations of
gay wealth, intimated that White privilege was a major impetus
behind the push for sexual orientation nondiscrimination
provisions.06
The folding of sexual minorities into a socioeconomic and
racially homogenous class continued well into the conclusion of the
document: "Historically, anti-discrimination laws were written for
specially protected classes-and nobody else. Caucasian males
under forty aren't protected by those laws. Millionaires born that
way. aren't protected by those laws.""' The last message left to
Colorado voters was that gays, millionaires, and youth are all cut
of the same cloth. Whether by virtue of the drafters' deliberate
intent or otherwise, the language presented to Colorado voters
contained the unmistakable message that sexual minority rights
was merely code for White privilege.
D. The Deepening Myth
An increasingly noticeable divide between some members of
the African-American community and the LGBT community began
to publicly deepen through the 1990s-a time Professor Ladelle
McWhorter calls "a decade of growing animosity and distrust."'
Notable African-American ministers and activists, like Alveda
King, the niece of Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke out against
homosexuality and sexual minority rights in the late 1990s."o9
However, White evangelical leaders seeking to exploit racial
divisions exacerbated the ever more publicly noticeable divisions,
real or imagined.
Some, like the White Cleveland civil rights era leader Rev.
Dennis Kuby,"o planted more seeds of division in print. Kuby
wrote in the New York Times, "Gays are not subject to water hoses
or police dogs, denied access to lunch counters or prevented from
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, supra note 30, at 197.
108. LADELLE MCWHORTER, RACISM AND SEXUAL OPPRESSION IN ANGLO-
AMERICA: A GENEALOGY 23 (2009).
109. Id. at 24-25.
110. See Words of the Week, JET MAG., Oct. 6, 1966, at 30 (providing a brief
profile of Rev. Kuby).
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voting. Most gays are perceived as well educated, socially mobile
and financially comfortable.""'
Others, like the Traditional Values Coalition (TVC), took a
visual route. In 1993, the TVC widely distributed" a video
production entitled Gay Rights/Special Rights."' The video
highlighted interviews from leading conservatives including
former Mississippi Senator Trent Lott, Grover Norquist, Ralph
Reed, and Bill Bennett."4
That film, like the pro-Amendment 2 campaign literature,
framed the question of sexual minority rights with racialized
discourse. It began by pairing film footage of Martin Luther King,
Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech and participants in the 1963 March
on Washington for Jobs and Freedom with the 1993 pro-sexual
minority rights march."' The film drew a stark contrast between
the throngs of Black protesters in 1963 juxtaposed to the
overwhelmingly White 1993 crowds. It then moved into a vetting
of the differences between race and sexual orientation, leading one
woman, identified as Cheryl Coleman, to conclude that sexual
orientation protections "would completely neutralize the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.""
The TVC's faux documentary, leaning on the Anita Bryant-
like predatory argumentation, suggested a major policy aim of the
sexual minority community was to repeal all age of consent laws."'
As the film narrator delves into the claim that the sexual minority
community sought repeal of age of consent laws, footage shows two
very young African-American boys, presumably at the 1993
Washington D.C. march, waving while draped in rainbow flags."'
While the film's producers utilized minutes of reel showing
overwhelmingly White crowds and White "spokespersons""' for the
111. Dennis G. Kuby, Different Set of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at 16.
112. Bettina Boxall, Gays, Foes Seek Spin that Sells, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993,
at Al (discussing the national distribution of the "Gay Rights/Special Rights"
videotapes); Farai Chideya, How the Right Stirs Black Homophobia, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 73 (noting a purported 50,000 copies of the video were sold
nationwide).
113. GAY RIGHTS/SPECIAL RIGHTS: INSIDE THE HOMOSEXUAL AGENDA (Jeremiah







119. The film shows interviews with supposed participants in the 1993
Washington march as well as other activists who held an official capacity with an
organized group-all were White. GAY RIGHTS/SPECIAL RIGHTS, supra note 113.
136 [Vol. 31:117
GAY GENTRIFICATION
sexual minority community, they deliberately chose to focus on
two, non-White children as they linked LGBT people to pedophilia.
The tactics of the Save Our Children Campaign now merged with
racialized rhetoric successfully used the year prior in Colorado.
This trend continued well into the late 1990s and early
2000s. A study by professors Amy Stone and Jane Ward analyzed
452 political messages from 53 different sexual minority-related
initiatives or referenda between 1977 and 2000.120 They concluded
that as the LGBT Rights Movement progressed, anti-rights
groups' dichotomous treatment of homosexuality and Blackness as
mutually exclusive traits increased.121 Stone and Ward's research
suggests that the racialized language increased because it had
more currency with the electorate in the late 1990s and early
2000s. The depictions garnered more traction with LGBT rights-
opponents because LGBT activists "validated" the depictions by
pursing equality within establishment institutions. They
conclude:
[Tihe more radical, countercultural, and coalition-leaning gay
liberation movement of the 1970s (as well as the AIDS
devastated and outrage-driven queer movement of the 1980s
and 1990s) worked against divisive comparisons to Blackness
by asserting that solidarity across difference and freedom from
all forms of violent oppression were primary movement goals.
Admittedly, such efforts were far from intersectional, in that
they still regarded queerness and Blackness as separate and
distinct subjectivities. However, the gay and lesbian
movement of the twenty-first century has moved even further
away from the work of intersectional social justice; its outrage
is now aimed at those who would deny us the entitlements of
normal, hardworking, upwardly-mobile-and White-citizens:
family, privacy, patriotism, respectability.122
Stone and Ward's conclusion argues that, in part, LGBT
rights opponents were able to capitalize on a racial and class
divide-and-conquer scheme because the sexual minority
community moved away from intersectional messages of liberation
towards whitewashed demands for equality vis-A-vis assimilation.
E. Not Liberation, but Assimilation
The sexual minority community's activism efforts prior to the
late 1980s were more liberationist in their flavor than pro-
assimilation.22 The rhetoric surrounding those campaigns
120. Stone & Ward, supra note 80, at 609.
121. Id. at 621.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 619.
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reflected that, when the LGBT community fought for liberation,
the response rested on efforts to suppress them and stave off a
burgeoning predatory class. When that class sought and continues
to seek assimilation, the response takes a different tenor: special
rights.
The early 1990s saw new prominent efforts to secure equality
for sexual minorities through the institution of marriage.124 The
underlying impetus behind this movement may have its roots in
1989 when the State Bar Association of California publicly
endorsed same-sex marriages.125 As reported in The New York
Times, the same-sex marriage movement between the 1970s and
1980s was "all but dormant."12' The article posited that "the
debate [was] revived . . . [because of] the AIDS epidemic, which
[had] brought questions of inheritance and death benefits to many
people's minds."27 A few short years later in 1993, Hawaii courts
began an inquiry into the constitutionality of Hawaii's denial of
marriage rights to same-sex couples.12 ' Other cases would follow
in the late 1990s in Alaska'.. and Vermont.2 0
However, it was the Hawaii state cases that prompted a
national backlash. In 1996, Congress was fearful Hawaii's courts
would mandate marriage equality."' If Hawaii's Supreme Court
found a right to same-sex marriage, a flood of same-sex couples
could travel to Hawaii, marry, and return to the lower forty-eight
124. Prior attempts to secure marriage equality through the courts were
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) ("No
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of
Appeals or by respondent.") (emphasis added); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,
590 (Ky. 1973) (striking down a constitutional claim to same-sex marriage); Baker
v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting claims of a state statutory
and federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810
(1972) (dismissing for want of a substantial federal question).
125. Phillip S. Gustis, Small Steps Toward Acceptance Renew Debate on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1989, at E24.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration and
clarification granted in part, 852 P.2d 74 (Haw. 1993).
129. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743,
at 6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (finding a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage).
130. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (mandating equal civil benefits
akin to marriage for same-sex couples).
131. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996) ("[The Defense of Marriage Act] is a
response to a very particular development in the State of Hawaii. . . . The prospect
of permitting homosexual couples to "marry" in Hawaii threatens to have very real




and Alaska seeking marital reciprocity in their home state. 13 To
hedge against that scenario, Congress passed the Defense of
Marriage Act."' The issue of marriage equality took center stage
the same year Romer was decided and seven years before
Lawrence.
Marriage is a whitewashed, upper income institution in its
social construction"' and, for some feminist scholars, marriage
represents traditional forms of patriarchal repression."' The
racial construction of marriage is possibly attributable, in part, to
rapidly declining rates of married Black households and dominant
cultural portrayals of single Black mothers.36 It may be due to the
way in which government administers martial benefits. Black
families are disproportionately disadvantaged with respect to
marital tax policy.' Some scholars convincingly argue that these
perceptions of marriage are tied to a shift in marital culture that
holds marriage as an institution for higher income earners."'
Professor Ralph Richard Banks argues the shift created a
"paradox of marriage in the United States . . . [in] that its cultural
prominence persists even as it has shed many of the social
functions that traditionally prompted people to marry.""9 Thus,
while marriage was at one time a means to an end of financial and
social stability, today financial and social stability are
prerequisites to marriage.'' A newly entered marriage, as it is
contemporarily understood, is a mark of already cemented
achievement and a means to the end of fulfilling the desire for a
loving relationship."' If Professor Banks is correct in his analysis
of marriage in the modern United States, LGBT rights advocates
play into the White privilege stereotype by grounding the modern
LGBT rights movement in marriage equality.
132. Id.
133. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended in sections of 1 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter DOMA].
134. See BANKS, supra note 32, at 27; NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY
OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 203 (2000) ("Only 56 percent of all adults were
currently married in the later 1990s . . . [Tihis general percentage, skewed by the
majority [Wihite population, masked the markedly lower rate of current marriage
among African American adults (about 40 percent).").
135. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 38, at 93-94 (describing feminist perspectives on
marriage equality advocacy).
136. BANKS, supra note 32, at 6-8.
137. Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature:
The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 1501-02 (1997).
138. BANKS, supra note 32, at 27.





Assimilation efforts were not reserved for civil society alone.
Renewed efforts to permit open military service began in the early
1990s. In 1993, President Bill Clinton and LGBT rights advocates
pushed to end the military's prohibition of homosexual service. 4 2
After a decade in which nearly 17,000 men and women in uniform
were dishonorably discharged for their sexual orientation at a cost
of $500 million to support investigations, the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy was a compromise between advocates for the status
quo and those for open service.'4 3 The policy permitted gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals to serve in the armed forces provided they
did not disclose their sexual orientation.'" Though a far cry from
equality, the efforts, nevertheless, brought sexual minorities into
the establishment fold.'4  Rather than taking an anti-
establishment posture, LGBT rights advocates sought equality
through avenues of patriotism.
The open military service agenda may seem to lack the racial
and class elements present on the marriage front. However, the
initial efforts to repeal the homosexual ban came off the heels of
heightened glorification of pre-Vietnam, whitewashed military
service. Professor George Lipsitz argues that prominent
depictions of military service that repeatedly resonated
throughout the "patriotic renewal" of the 1980s were a "conflation
of whiteness, masculinity, patriarchy, and heterosexuality . . . .""
Indeed, government and military officials employed the imagery of
World War II to embolden feelings of patriotism while overlooking
a stunning defeat in Vietnam. Professor Lipsitz synthesized the
whitewashing of military service in the 1980s:
World War II served as a suitable vehicle for patriotic revival
in the post-Vietnam era because of the contrasts between it
and the Vietnam War. The United States and its allies secured
a clear victory over the Axis powers in the Second World War,
the postwar era brought unprecedented prosperity, and the
unity forged in the face of wartime emergencies did much to
define the nationalism and patriotism of the Cold War era. Yet
the deployment of memories about World War II as a "good
war" also rested on nostalgia for a preintegration America,
when segregation in the military meant that most war heroes
were [Wihite, while de jure and de facto segregation on the
142. Eric Schmitt, Military Cites Wide Range of Reasons for Its Gay Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at Al.
143. Paul F. Horvitz, New U.S. Military Policy Tolerates Homosexuals: 'Don't
Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue' Is White House's Compromise Solution, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., July 20, 1993, at 1.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. LIPSITZ, supra note 32, at 75.
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home front channeled the fruits and benefits of victory
disproportionately to [Wihite citizens. 4 1
Products of popular culture during the 1990s also
whitewashed the military service of the "greatest generation." The
1998 blockbuster film Saving Private Ryan, for example, did not
depict a single Black solider throughout the Normandy invasion,
contrary to history." Similarly, books like Tom Brokaw's The
Greatest Generationl49 received criticism for lauding the efforts of
that Second World War generation that achieved undeniably
heroic military success, but did so within segregated military
units."' If one can fairly assert that these reflections of military
service in the 1980s and 1990s significantly color Americans'
perceptions of military service, then there may be a legitimate
claim that popular constructions of honorable military service are
culturally whitewashed.
Even the quest for open service subtly suggested a connection
between the LGBT community and affluence. One example is a
2007 New York Times op-ed arguing for the repeal of Don't Ask,
Don't Tell. The piece emphasizes discharges of outed highly
educated military personnel holding "critical jobs in intelligence,
medicine and counterterrorism.""' The op-ed, entitled "Don't Ask,
Don't Translate," highlights the more than fifty-eight Arabic
linguists discharged along with 11,000 other military men and
women under the policy.'' Later media reports echoed this
emphasis."'
The racial and class aspects of military service
notwithstanding, the military is undoubtedly an establishment
institution like marriage. Marriage and the military are
147. Id at 76.
148. SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (Dreamworks SKG 1998); NAT'L ARCHIVES & REC.
ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1999), http://www.archives.gov/about/plans-
reports/performance-accountability/annual/1999/1999-annual-report.pdf ("Nearly
1.2 million African Americans served in World War II, yet for the tens of millions of
moviegoers watching the epic D-day battle in Saving Private Ryan, not a single
African American soldier is presented.").
149. TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION xix-xx (1998).
150. See, e.g., Paul Duke, The Greatest Generation?, 78 VA. Q. REV. 19, 22 (2002)
("[Respect for veterans] does not justify a promotion [of the "greatest" generation]
to sainthood. The historical record compels honest and candid appraisal without
revisionist sugarcoating.").
151. Stephen Benjamin, Op-Ed., Don't Ask, Don't Translate, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2007, at A29.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Varied Forces Pushing Obama to Drop "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell,"N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at Al ("[Don't Ask, Don't Tell] has led to




foundational building blocks in which American culture is
grounded. By seeking acceptance through marriage and military
service, sexual minorities communicated to the public and to elites
that they sought assimilation into mainstream, patriarchal
institutions that would not undermine traditional heteronormative
power structures but rather reinforce them.
II. Convergence Realized
A. The Road Through Romer
Ten years after the Supreme Court rejected the idea that
there was a constitutional right to engage in homosexual conduct
in Bowers," the Court decided Romer.'" As previously argued, the
contours of sexual minority politics mutated between the 1970s
and the 1990s. The shift was not cabined in the political realm.
To the contrary, the underpinnings of sexual orientation rights
legal argumentation and doctrinal developments mirrored the
prevailing LGBT rights rhetoric of the day.
Intimations of homosexual wealth were replete in the briefs
submitted supporting Amendment 2 in Romer. The briefs
expressly depicted the LGBT community as wealthy, powerful,
and educated while subtly drawing a racial dichotomy between the
LGBT and African-American communities.
The State of Colorado's brief pointed to the electoral results
of Amendment 2 as evidence of LGBT power, arguing, "A group
with substantial political power . . . exercised that power in a
general election and attracted nearly 47% of the State's voters to
its position."156 An amicus brief submitted by seven states'
attorneys general described the LGBT community as a "special
interest group."' That brief paralleled the dissent from the
appealed Colorado Supreme Court decision in which the dissenting
justice described the sexual minority community as a "relatively
154. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
155. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
156. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 9, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039) (citation omitted). This argument was also successful in a 1990 case in the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding sexual minorities in the military.
See also High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574
(9th Cir. 1990) ("Moreover, legislatures have addressed and continue to address the
discrimination suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation
through the passage of anti-discrimination legislation. Thus, homosexuals are not
without political power; they have the ability to and do 'attract the attention of the
lawmakers,' as evidenced by such legislation.") (citation omitted).
157. Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
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politically powerful and privileged special interest group."1" This
term has a connotation of wealth, privilege, and elitism attached
to it; for Washington elites, like the Justices, it echoes of K Street
dominance.159
The briefs reflected the racialized language presented in
campaign literature in a more tempered manner. One brief
headlined, "There Is No Proof Here Of Purposeful Discrimination
Against A Racial Or Other Constitutionally Suspect Class."6 o
Another brief described the Colorado Supreme Court's striking
down Amendment 2 as "declining to bootstrap homosexuals into
the classical civil rights framework of suspect classifications, [but]
nevertheless . . . [according] homosexuals the protections of a
special class.""' These descriptions paint a class based on non-
heterosexual sexual orientation as distinct from racial minorities,
thus whitewashing the LGBT community and denying the
existence of intersectional identities, such as sexual minorities of
color.
The brief submitted by the Family Research Council honed in
on the notion that the LGBT community sought rights above and
beyond necessity. That brief mentioned "special" in six distinct
variations that included "special protection, l62 "special status,"
"special constitutional guarantee,"" "special recognition,"
"special class, "'" and "special privileges""' to describe what
Amendment 2 prohibited. The "special rights" argument
prominently resurfaced in oral arguments-the term was used in
some variation numerous times.'
158. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1366 (Colo. 1994) (Erickson, J., dissenting).
159. K Street is where a large number of lobbying and special interest
organizations are located within the District of Columbia. It is often associated
with powerful political interests with deep pockets. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, The
Road to Riches Is Called K Street; Lobbying Firms Hire More, Pay More, Charge
More to Influence Government, WASH. POST, June 22, 2005, at Al (describing the
political clout and wealth held by lobbyists and lobbying organizations located on K
Street).
160. Brief for Colorado for Family Values as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 16, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
161. Brief of the Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 15-16, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
162. Id. at 6.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 14 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting)).
165. Id. at 15.
166. Brief of the Family Research Council, supra note 161, at 16.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
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The American Center for Law and Justice Family Life
Project's amicus brief in Romer massaged constructions of White
privilege into the special rights argument:
First, homosexuals are not a group in need of special
protection from majoritarian processes. Homosexuals as a
group are comparatively more affluent and better educated
than similarly situated heterosexuals. Homosexuals also are
not a politically powerless minority. Second, homosexuality,
unlike race, national origin, and sex, is not an immutable
characteristic that is irrelevant to personal character. Rather,
homosexuals as a class are defined by their sexual proclivities
and conduct. 69
The State of Colorado's brief piggybacked on the false
statements iterated in other briefs to support the State's first
justification for Amendment 2: "[Gliven limited resources, the
people of Colorado plainly could conclude that anti-discrimination
protections should be reserved for those who are particularly
deserving of special protection."' Surely, the State would argue,
those who were Whiter, wealthier, more educated, more mobile,
more traveled, and disproportionately more politically powerful
than the general population-people who might well be among the
Justices' elite social circles-could not possibly need additional
protections of the law.
Like those in Romer, the Lawrence.'. briefs also made racial
and class based arguments. The amicus brief for Pro Family Law
Center, Traditional Values Coalition, Traditional Values
Education and Legal Institute, and James Hartline tapped into
language suggesting racial minorities and sexual minorities are
mutually exclusive groups. The brief read, "[Ilt is wrong for
Petitioners to compare homosexual persons with minorities and
women for purposes of Equal Protection.""' Using Romer era
rhetoric, the brief warned that if "the mere tendency to engage in
sodomy is a protected Constitutional status, being a woman or a
racial minority becomes meaningless.""'
Of greater importance, however, was that LGBT rights
opponents in Lawrence honed in upon the institution of
169. Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice Family Life Project as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(No. 94-1039).
170. Brief for Petitioners at 13, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039) (emphasis added).
171. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
172. Brief of Pro Family Law Center et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of




marriage-anti-sodomy laws were the final backstop to same-sex
marriage. The Family Research Council warned the Court of the
looming "threat":
This Court is probably aware of political movements [sic]
which seek to reform marriage law, precisely to require
recognition of same-sex relationships as marriages. This Court
is also probably aware of political movements [sic] which seek
to re-affirm, and thereby to preserve marriage as the union of
a man and a woman. 7 4
Another amicus brief warned that to find a constitutional
right to sodomy would invalidate "any law precluding same-sex
couples from marriage or other family relations [as] a product of
. . . individious [sic] discrimination."' The brief cited pending
marriage equality litigation before state courts in Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and Indiana.'7 6
The amicus brief for Alabama, South Carolina, and Utah
sought to steer the Court away from applying heightened scrutiny
for constitutional claims arising from sexual orientation
discrimination, suggesting that "ruling on that question might
have implications not just for the anti-sodomy statutes of Texas
and amici, but also for laws that prohibit same-sex marriages and
laws that permit only heterosexual couples to adopt.""
The cases also differ in emphasis in oral arguments. In
Lawrence, Texas's representative concluded by emphasizing that if
the Court found a right to engage in sodomy, it would undermine
the constitutionally protected status of heterosexual marriage:
I'm sure it's obvious to this Court that the issues of
homosexual rights are highly emotional for the petitioner in
these quarters but equally anxious in this Court's-for this
Court's decision are those who are, number one, concerned
with the rights of states to determine their own destiny, and,
two, and possibly more important, those persons who are
concerned that the invalidation of this little Texas statute
would make marriage law subject to constitutional
challenge.17
174. Brief of the Family Research Council, Inc. & Focus on the Family as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Respondent at 16, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(No. 02-102).
175. Motion for Leave to Submit Brief for the Center for Marriage Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (No. 02-102).
176. Id. at 19.
177. Brief of the States of Ala., S.C., & Utah as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 20, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).




Compare this with the only mention in Bowers's oral
argument that cautioned a right to sodomy threatened the
institution of "traditional" marriage. There, the State of Georgia's
solicitor warned that a right to sodomy would call into question
the "legitimacy of statutes which prohibit polygamy; homosexual,
same-sex marriage; consensual incest; prostitution; fornication;
adultery; and possibly even personal possession in private of
illegal drugs."'" In Lawrence, same-sex marriage was singled out
for special consideration, whereas in Bowers same-sex marriage
was cast as one element in an entire parade of horribles.
Same-sex marriage simply carried greater weight in
Lawrence than in Bowers. There is no better evidence of this than
in the briefs. Only two briefs submitted before the Bowers Court
visited the relationship between the constitutionality of anti-
sodomy laws and same-sex marriage.'" Conversely, ten briefs in
Lawrence specifically raised same-sex marriage as an issue-an
increase of 400 percent.1'
While the decisions in both Bowers and Lawrence turned on
the issue of a constitutional right to homosexual sodomy, it is clear
from the briefs and oral argument that the Justices were much
more informed (and presumably mindful) of the decision's
potential impact on related matters embedded in family law. 8'
179. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(No. 85-140).
180. See Reply Brief of Petitioner Michael J. Bowers Attorney General of Ga. at
38, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140); Brief of the Rutherford Institute et al. in
support of Petitioner as Amicus Curiae at 27-28, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
181. See Brief of Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 12, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Brief of
Center for Ariz. Policy & Pro-Family Network as Amicus Curiae in Support
Respondent at 4, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Brief of the
American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent
at 1, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Motion of Center for
Marriage Law for Leave of Court to File Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 21, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (motion
granted Mar. 3, 2003); Motion of the Center for Law & Justice International for
Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (motion granted Mar. 10, 2003); Brief of the
Family Research Council, Inc. & Focus on the Family as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Respondent at 15-21, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102);
Brief of Liberty Counsel as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 20-23,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Brief of Pro Family Law
Center et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8, Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Brief of the States of Ala., S.C., & Utah as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 20, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(No. 02-102); Brief of United Families International as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 2, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
182. Oral argument in Lawrence, for example, also delved into same-sex
adoptions. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 178, at
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Indeed, Justice Kennedy took great care to distance Lawrence from
the fomenting marriage equality debate.'"
By linking challenges to Texas's sodomy prohibition to
marriage equality efforts, opponents of sexual minority rights
reaffirmed their early depictions of sexual minorities as White and
privileged. Texas's representatives and their allies highlighted
that same-sex couples sought full acceptance and assimilation
through the conservative institution of marriage, which is
increasingly the hallmark of economic, societal, and professional
success.*
B. The Proof of the Pudding is in Scalia's Eating
Professor Bell's original interest-convergence theory, as
applied to Brown", may have been supported by greater evidence
had the Brown decision been divided." The opinion was
unanimous. However, sexual minorities have yet to see a unified
Supreme Court decision in their favor.' There is jurisprudential
evidence that the White privilege undertones struck a chord with
the dissenting Justices-which is perhaps the best evidence,
barring an express admission, that the White privilege-laced
arguments were discussed in conference and positively resonated
with the Justices forming the Romer and Lawrence majorities.
Justice Scalia is one of the Supreme Court's consistent
dissenters in its recent pro-sexual minority rights jurisprudence in
Romer, Lawrence, and Martinez.'"8 Scalia's dissents in Romer and
20-21.
183. "[The Lawrence decision] does not involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. See infra Part II.B for greater discussion on this part of
Justice Kennedy's opinion.
184. For a larger discussion, see infra Part II.E.
185. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
186. See Bell, supra note 22, at 527-28.
187. Bowers was a 5-to-4 decision with Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger
writing individual concurrences. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 199 (opinion of
Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Romer
was a 6-to-3 decision. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (opinion of Scalia,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J., dissenting). Lawrence mustered a five-
Justice majority finding a substantive due process right to engage in same-sex
relations. Justice O'Connor's vote concurred with the majority's result but saw the
case better suited for an Equal Protection analysis. See supra text accompanying
note 13; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971 (2010) (upholding law
school's policy of requiring officially recognized student groups to comply with
school's nondiscrimination policy, prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, as
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Lawrence reflect the rhetoric of the 1990s that sexual minorities
are a privileged elite class. He regurgitated the unreliable
statistics concerning "gay wealth" cited by Amendment 2
opponents in Romer, writing that "those who engage in
homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in
certain communities [and] have high disposable income.""
Justice Scalia hinted at an insightful interest-convergence
argument as to why his fellow Justices felt comfortable
overturning Amendment 2. Scalia opined, "This Court has no
business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by
the elite class from which the Members of this institution are
selected, pronouncing that 'animosity' toward homosexuality is
evil."190
The articulate and fierce dissenter took it one step further in
his Romer dissent:
How [the legal community] feels about homosexuality will be
evident to anyone who wishes to interview job applicants at
virtually any of the Nation's law schools. The interviewer may
refuse to offer a job because the applicant is a Republican;
because he is an adulterer; because he went to the wrong prep
school or belongs to the wrong country club; because he eats
snails; because he is a womanizer; because she wears real-
animal fur; or even because he hates the Chicago Cubs. But if
the interviewer should wish not to be an associate or partner
of an applicant because he disapproves of the applicant's
homosexuality, then he will have violated the pledge which the
Association of American Law Schools requires all its member
schools to exact from job interviewers: "assurance of the
employer's willingness" to hire homosexuals.' 9'
The Justice's intent was surely to highlight that the LGBT
community is a powerful and visible force within the legal
community and that visibility makes it easier for his fellow
Justices to grant rights to a group of people with whom lawyers
typically associate. Bringing Scalia's point to its logical end,
LGBT people typically look and behave just as privileged, well-to-
do lawyers look and behave. But Scalia actually couched
homosexuality among the vestiges of elite privilege. Justice Scalia
treats same-sex sexual conduct as the equivalent of playing a
game of squash at the country club.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence assailed the majority as
not violative of free speech or free association).
189. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
191. Id. at 652-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a "product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to
the so-called homosexual agenda, . . . [which constitutes] . . . the
agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at
eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached
to homosexual conduct."' The Lawrence dissent expanded on his
Romer dissent. Justice Scalia interpreted the majority opinion as
a byproduct of elitist convergence:
So imbued is the Court with the law profession's anti-anti-
homosexual culture, that it is seemingly unaware that the
attitudes of that culture are not obviously "mainstream"; that
in most States what the Court calls "discrimination" against
those who engage in homosexual acts is perfectly legal; that
proposals to ban such "discrimination" under Title VII have
repeatedly been rejected by Congress.!
The Lawrence dissent when taken as a whole with the Romer
dissent stands for the proposition that despite "widespread"
disapproval of homosexuality, the merger of elite legal interests
and the White privileged LGBT community's interests marked the
death knell of Bowers.
The identity jurisprudence aside, it is also important that
finding a constitutional right to private homosexual conduct did
not undermine heteronormative interests-a point Justice
Kennedy made very clear in the majority opinion:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It
does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual
consent from each other, egaged in sexual practices common
to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to
respect for their private lives. 5
Justice Kennedy's opinion emphasizes that there is no harm
to heteronormative norms with the majority's decision.96 But
192. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. I submit that the term "lifestyle" also has a similar connotation that fits
within the view of the LGBT community as one of wealthy WASPs. This is
arguably a more difficult case to make because the word, by definition, is class
neutral. The Merriam-Webster definition of "lifestyle" is "the typical way of life of
an individual, group, or culture." In its colloquial use, I believe there is an
undertone of suggested opulence, e.g., "lifestyles of the rich and famous."
195. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
196. Also of note, there is no mention of HIV/AIDS or other sexually transmitted
diseases in any of the Lawrence opinions. The Court in Bowers did not address
concerns about sexually transmitted diseases either. See supra Part I.B for a
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there is something more that Justice Kennedy did not directly
address that Justice Burger's memorandum did: the threat that
the Lawrence decision might have posed to heteronormative
institutions like religious organizations or the Boy Scouts.'" The
Lawrence Court's remedy did not threaten these heteronormative
institutions. In actuality, the Court already neutralized many of
these concerns.
In Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston,'" an Irish-American association challenged a
court order that forced it to allow an LGBT Irish organization to
march in their annual parade consistent with Massachusetts's
public accommodations law.'" The parade organizers argued that
the LGBT group communicated a message that conflicted with the
organizers' beliefs, thus forcibly compelling speech.2 " The
Supreme Court held that Massachusetts could not compel the
parade organizers to include the LGBT organization in its public
Saint Patrick's Day parade consistent with the First
Amendment.20'
Similarly, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,202 the Supreme
Court rejected New Jersey's application of a state public
accommodations law that forced Boy Scout troops to accept openly
gay leadership over the Boy Scouts's moral objections.203 The
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment's right to free
association protected the Boy Scouts of America's right to prohibit
openly gay leadership notwithstanding state nondiscrimination
laws.20
Taken together, the majority and dissenting opinions make
clear that the shift from Bowers to Lawrence was driven by
broader discussion of Bowers and HIV/AIDS. For Lawrence, whatever fears may
have emanated from public health concerns were possibly assuaged by the medical
community's assertion that the majority's position would not act as a detriment to
the public health. See Brief of the American Public Health Ass'n. et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10-18, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(No. 02-102). However, similar arguments were also made in briefs submitted
before the Court in Bowers. See Brief of American Psychological Ass'n. & American
Public Health Ass'n. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20-27, Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
197. See Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell, supra note
67.
198. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
199. Id. at 561-62.
200. Id. at 574-75.
201. Id. at 566.
202. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).




something more than the fact Bowers "was not correct when it was
decided."'2 ' The confluence of judicial perceptions of shared
identity, doctrinal developments in Hurley and Dale, and the lack
of a threat posed to the heteronormative establishment by private
homosexual conduct paved the way for Bowers's demise.
Ironically, the greatest alleged threat to the establishment
was the looming possibility of thousands of same-sex couples
waiting at floodgates to get married.206 But this supposed "gloom
and doom" was not given consideration in Bowers despite a few
failed attempts to secure marriage equality through litigation in
the 1970s, because converging identity interests had not yet fused.
The Bowers Justices failed to move cognitively beyond the
prevailing deviant construction.
With respect to the same-sex marriage threat, the Lawrence
dissenters' argument backfired. By highlighting that sexual
minorities sought acceptance into a conservative social institution,
the dissenters actually minimized perceptions of sexual minorities
as a radical threat to existing social order. The dissenters'
peripheral warnings that the Lawrence majority posed a threat to
traditional heteronormative institutions, like the Boy Scouts or
religious organizations, were already largely neutralized by the
Court in Dale and Hurley. As a result, the focus was even more
concentrated on marriage. Similarly, in Romer the dissenters'
outcry of LGBT privilege had the opposite of the intended effect.
For the elite Justices, there was little threat to the body politic in
protecting a "privileged" class's ability to exercise political power.
The Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence opinions are strong
evidence that once shared identity interests are realized, judicial
remedies favoring sexual minorities will be authorized provided
they do not undermine the power or authority of peer,
heterosexual stakeholders.
205. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
206. See id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This is the same justification that
supports many other laws regulating sexual behavior that make a distinction based
upon the identity of the partner-for example, . . . laws refusing to recognize
homosexual marriage."); id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (foreshadowing
challenges to same-sex marriage prohibitions) ("Texas cannot assert any legitimate
state interest here, such as national security or preserving the traditional
institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations-the
asserted state interest in this case-other reasons exist to promote the institution
of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.").
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III. The Marriage Trajectory
A. Early Marriage Equality Efforts
The first successful effort to achieve marriage equality was in
a 2003 decision from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage under the
Massachusetts Constitution.207 The Massachusetts ruling had
profound consequences for religious social service organizations,
most notably Catholic Charities. Catholic Charities withdrew
from the business of foster care rather than serve same-sex
couples.20 Opponents of marriage equality decried the
developments in Boston, fearing they would likely reverberate
throughout the country, threatening religious liberty.2" But as
legislatures began to assume the duties of implementing marriage
equality, legislators and religious liberty scholars2 10 would craft
public policy that advanced civil equality for sexual minorities and
preserve religious institutions' religious liberty.
If interest convergence will continue to benefit sexual
minorities in federal constitutional challenges to marriage
discrimination, these types of religious liberty suppression fears
cannot remain. As the theory proffers, judges will authorize
remedies only when both interests converge and the remedy to
enforce those interests will not threaten heteronormative power,
e.g., the Catholic Church."
207. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
208. See Patricia Wen, "They Cared for the Children": Amid Shifting Social
Winds, Catholic Charities Prepares to End its 103 Years of Finding Homes for
Foster Children and Evolving Families, Bos. GLOBE, June 25, 2006, at Al
(reporting Massachusetts's consideration to revoke Catholic Charities's adoption
license for religious-based refusals to place children in same-sex households); see
also Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes Over Same-Sex
Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 475, 482 (2008) (describing dismissals and
resignations of social services workers in jurisdictions without individual
conscience same-sex marriage protections).
209. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5527 (June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Santorum) ("Is the fate of Catholic Charities of Boston an aberration or a sign of
things to come? Some say we are overreacting, but the truth is that while the
ramifications in the battle for social policy, procreation, and even protecting
children may be clear, the real-but hidden-battlel ]lines are for the religious
liberty of all faiths.").
210. See Peter Steinfels, Same-Sex Marriage Laws Pose Protection Quandary,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2009, at A13 (describing the work of religious liberty scholars
Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson and Professor Douglas Laycock lobbying for
religious liberty protections in New Hampshire's then-pending marriage equality
legislation).
211. I use the Catholic Church as an example of heteronormative institutional
power not to demonize the Church, but to highlight a prominent example of a
religious institution that has a large following, carries significant political weight,
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B. Religious Liberty in the Laboratories of Democracy
In every jurisdiction where marriage equality was
legislatively enacted and took effect 212 and in Connecticut,'21 there
has been an increasing emphasis on religious accommodation
exemptions and religious liberty protections.
All of the aforementioned jurisdictions provide exemptions in
existing nondiscrimination law for religious institutions from
providing space for the celebration or solemnization of marriages
inconsistent with those institutions' religious tenants.2 " Four
states allow religiously affiliated organizations to limit privileges
in celebration of marriage." Another four jurisdictions expressly
immunize religious institutions or religious organizations from
private suits for failing to solemnize or celebrate a marriage. 216Yet
another four provide in their marriage equality legislation
prohibitions of government penalties, e.g., the awarding of
government contracts or tax exemption status for religious
and has presented a unified front opposing marriage equality, as opposed to
evangelicals who lack comprehensive hierarchical organization or the Episcopal
Church which has no unified position on marriage equality. See Laurie Goodstein,
Bishops Open 'Religious Liberty' Drive, N.Y. TIMES,,Nov. 15, 2011, at A14 (citing
Roman Catholic bishops' political activities in opposition to same-sex marriages);
see also Michael Barbaro, Behind Gay Marriage, an Unlikely Mix of Forces, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2011, at Al (highlighting the New York Catholic bishops'
opposition to the 2011 New York Marriage Equality Act); Shaila Dewan, True to
Episcopal Church's Past, Bishops Split on Gay Weddings, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2011, at Al (noting a division among New York's Episcopal bishops' positions
concerning same-sex marriage ceremonies).
212. These jurisdictions include Vermont, New Hampshire, the District of
Columbia, and New York. Maine legislatively enacted marriage equality but that
legislation was repealed by referendum. See Abby Goodnough, A Setback in Maine
for Gay Marriage, but Medical Marijuana Law Expands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/us/politics/05maine.html. Washington and
Maryland successfully passed marriage equality legislation with robust religious
liberty protections in 2012 that are pending due to referendum challenges.
Governor Christopher Christie vetoed New Jersey's 2012 legislation, which
contained similar religious liberty protections. That veto faces the potential for
override until January 2014. See Alice Popovici, Maryland Gay Marriage Bill
Passes, Heads to Governor, REUTERS, Feb. 23, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/24/us-usa-gaymarriage-maryland-
idUSTRE81M2CW20120224 (summarizing the status of marriage equality
legislation in Maryland, New Jersey, and Washington).
213. The Connecticut Supreme Court mandated marriage equality under the
Connecticut State Constitution. Kerrigan v. Comm'r. of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,
482 (Conn. 2008).
214. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35a (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)(1)
(LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(iii) (2011); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
10-b(1) (McKinney 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4502(a)(4) (2011)
215. § 46b-35a; § 457:37(iii); DoM. REL. § 10-b (1); tit. 8, § 4502(a)(4).
216. § 46b-35a; D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2) (Lexis Nexis 2012); DoM. REL. § 10-b(1);
tit. 8, § 4502(a)(4).
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organizations that object to same-sex marriages. New
Hampshire and Vermont grant exemptions for religious
organizations that do not want to provide insurance coverage for
married same-sex couples."' Connecticut's exemptions permit
adoption and foster care agencies, like Catholic Charities, to limit
placement of children to married heterosexuals, provided they
receive no government funding.219 New Hampshire and New York
provide immunity for individual employees of religious
organizations that refuse to solemnize or celebrate same-sex
marriages from lawsuits.220
These legislative developments were crucial to the passage of
marriage equality legislation221 and continue to drive the debate in
current marriage equality efforts.222 These religious liberty
provisions do not operate in a vacuum. Rather, they exist within a
broader backdrop of First Amendment jurisprudence that protects
religious and quasi-secular organizations from government
compelled speech to support homosexuality,223 forced association
with openly LGBT people,2 ' and government interference with
ministerial employees at religious institutions.225
These developments form the underpinnings of what interest-
convergence theory suggests will happen to future constitutional
challenges to same-sex marriage bans. Preexisting notions of
217. § 46b-35a; § 46-406(e)(2); § 457:37(iii); DOM. REL. § 10-b(1).
218. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(iv) (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4501(b)
(2011).
219. § 46b-35b.
220. § 457:37(iii); DOM. REL. § 10-b(1).
221. See Nicholas Confessore & Danny Hakim, Cuomo Is Urged to Alter Same-
Sex Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A28 (reporting the backroom
haggling over religious liberty provisions between New York State Senate
Republicans and Governor Andrew Cuomo).
222. See, e.g., Annie Linskey, Church Support for Marriage Bill, BALT. SUN, Jan.
25, 2012, at A2, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-01-25/news/bs-
md-same-sex-religion-20120124_1_marriage-bill-gay-marriages-religious-
protections (describing Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley's push for marriage
equality with improved religious liberty provisions from earlier failed marriage
equality legislation).
223. See Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc.,
515 U.S. 557, 557 (1995) (holding that the State of Massachusetts could not compel
an Irish-American organization sponsoring a public parade to include an LGBT
organization under state nondiscrimination law, because the LGBT organization
conveyed a message contrary to the organizers' wishes).
224. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (ruling that the
First Amendment's right to free association protected the Boy Scouts of America to
prohibit openly gay leadership, notwithstanding state nondiscrimination laws).
225. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132
S.Ct. 694, 710 (2012) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits a dismissed
minister's employment discrimination suit against a religious employer).
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LGBT community affluence and political clout continue 226 to exist
in society and are widely reflected in the media.227 These notions
are reinforced in marriage-related litigation, because it projects, as
feminist theorist Audre Lorde might describe it, that the LGBT
community is seeking to dismantle the master's house with the
master's tools. 2 8 But the convergence of interests vis-A-vis
226. Some of the racialized aspects of the 1990s rhetoric are reinforced by the
marriage equality debate. Take, for example, the 2008 vote for Proposition 8 in
California. A majority of Black voters voted to ban same-sex marriages,
exacerbating the schism between the African-American and White LGBT
communities. The deepening divide is not limited to the ballot box. In Maryland,
where legislators in 2011 and 2012 considered marriage equality legislation, the
strong opposition to marriage equality by the African-American community,
African-American legislators, and African-American pastors was prominent. See
Sabrina Tavernise, Gay Marriage Bill Posing a Tough Sell To Blacks in Maryland,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at Al8. See also Frank Bruni, Race, Religion and Same-
Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, at A27 (discussing promotional efforts by
the Human Rights Campaign to gain Black voters' support for Maryland's same-sex
marriage bill, in response to polling results indicating lower rates of support among
Black Americans); Petula Dvorak, For Maryland's Gay Legislators, Moment of
Truth Looms on Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/for-marylands-gay-legislators-moment-of-
truth-looms-on-same-sex-marriage/2012/02/16/gIQABng8HR-story.html (describing
one lesbian legislator in Maryland as "a little tired of African Americans who
dismiss [marriage quality efforts in 2012] as [an issue] that matters only to a bunch
of well-to-do gay [W]hite men.") (last visited Sept. 19, 2012); Miranda S. Spivak,
Speaking Out for Same-Sex Marriage Law, Black Minister Stands Apart, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 13, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/speaking-out-for-same-
sex-marriage-law-black-minister-stands-apart/2012/02/12/gIQA8jj5BR~story.html
(documenting an African-American preacher publicly backing the Maryland same-
sex marriage bill, despite his home community's lack of support) (last visited Sept.
19, 2012).
227. See BADGETr, supra note 97, at 116-17; see also, e.g., Tina Mabry, The
Preponderance of Flatscreen TVs Doesn't Mean LGBT Characters of Color Have to
Flatline, HUFFPOST GAY VOICES (Dec. 11, 2011, 7:15 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tina-mabry/1gbt-african-american-
characters b_1156076.html (critiquing the limited exposure of Black LGBT
characters in American television) (last visited Sept. 19, 2012); Rob Smith, Opinion:
The Bearable Whiteness of Being Gay, CNN.cOM (Feb. 2, 2012, 1:29 PM),
http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/02/opinion-the-bearable-whiteness-of-being-
gay/ (describing the whitewashed, affluent portrayal of the LGBT community in
advertisement, pop culture, and media circles) (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
Prominent television series also reinforce the myth. See, e.g., Will & Grace (NBC
television broadcast 1998-2006) (featuring as a main character an affluent gay
lawyer who has an Ivy League pedigree and is from a wealthy, White Connecticut
family). Academic writing also reflects this line of thought. See, e.g., THOMAS
SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR
DETROIT xxv (2005) (connecting urban revitalization with the rise of LGBT
neighborhoods) ("Nearly every city has a trendy 'gayborhood,' hip artists' colonies
and loft districts, and funky enclaves where young people sip lattes and buy
vintage clothing. Urban places that were once written off as dead are now buzzing
with life.").
228. See Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's
House, in FEMINIST POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A READER 25 (Reina Lewis & Sara
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"shared" wealthy, White identity alone will not authorize full
marriage equality. Without assurance that marriage equality will
not threaten the heteronormative establishment, judicial remedies
may only mandate civil union-like partnerships for LGBT
individuals seeking same-sex marriage.
A 2006 decision from the New Jersey State Supreme Court
best illustrates the complications that constrain judicial remedies
for marriage inequality. In Lewis v. Harris,229 the court
unanimously held that denying same-sex couples the benefits
afforded to married opposite-sex couples violated the guarantees of
equal protection under the New Jersey State Constitution.230
However, what divided the court was the remedy. A four-justice
majority held that the remedy was a matter of legislative
deference.231 The remaining three justices rejected the majority's
decision to defer the question of appropriate remedy to the New
Jersey legislature and proffered that marriage alone was the
proper remedy.232
Full equality for sexual minorities demands that the right to
marry be extended to all individuals without regard to sexual
orientation. Civil unions, though an important step in the long
march to LGBT equality, communicate inferiority.233 Civil unions
are not an acceptable or permanent solution.2 34 However, to avoid
Mills eds., 2003).
229. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
230. Id. at 224.
231. Id. ("[Tihe Legislature must either amend the marriage statutes or enact an
appropriate statutory structure within 180 days of the date of this decision.").
232. Id. at 231 (Portiz, C.J., dissenting) ("On this day, the majority parses
plaintiffs' rights to hold that plaintiffs must have access to the tangible benefits of
state-sanctioned heterosexual marriage. I would extend the Court's mandate to
require that same-sex couples have access to the 'status' of marriage and all that
the status of marriage entails.").
233. See, e.g., Michael Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy
Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 291, 338 (2001) ("[Ilf a State passed a civil
union statute for same-sex couples that paralleled marriage, it would be sending a
message that these unions were in some way second class units . . . .").
234. The New Jersey legislature recently rejected the argument that civil unions
are an acceptable alternative to marriage. See S. 1, 2012 Leg., 215th Sess. (N.J.
2012) ("Both the New Jersey Civil Union Review Commission and the Senate
Judiciary Committee heard overwhelming evidence that the separate and inferior
label of civil union stigmatizes children and parents in civil unions, at school and in
other settings, and causes psychological harm."). The New Jersey legislature
passed marriage equality, but the measure was vetoed by the New Jersey governor.
See Kate Zernike, Christie Keeps His Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at A19. Litigation is underway in the New Jersey courts to
invalidate the civil union law and mandate marriage equality as the only
appropriate remedy to ensure the full recognition of rights found in Lewis. Garden
State Equality v. Dow, No. 1729-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed June 30, 2011).
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future decisions that parallel Lewis, good political lawyering must
emphasize the minimal impact that marriage equality will have on
heteronormative institutions and interests. If the justices in New
Jersey, New York, Maryland, Vermont, and Washington had been
able to avail themselves of the fomenting policy debates and
enacted legislation squaring religious liberty with civil marriage
equality in 2008 and 2009, then each of these courts may very well
have mandated marriage equality.23 5 The current policy debates in
states working to enact marriage equality will help sustain sexual
minorities' claims to a fundamental right to marry. The statutory
schemes enacted in those states serve as indispensable evidence
for judges that the interests of the LGBT community do not
undermine the rights of religious institutions, religious social
service groups, or other fraternal organizations.
C. National Security Convergence Returns
As Professor Bell originally commented, the Brown v. Board
of Education..6 decision came to fruition due to overriding national
Importantly, this case may very well turn on the robust religious liberty protections
provided in the legislatively successful marriage equality effort. New Jersey
legislators signaled to the New Jersey Supreme Court that the legislature was
willing and able to provide religious exemptions to minimize the potential for
conflict between religious liberty and civil marriage equality.
235. It is worth noting that expansive religious liberty policy debates relating to
marriage equality had not yet unfolded. The first states to legislatively enact
marriage equality with religious liberty protections were Connecticut (pursuant to
judicial order) and Vermont in 2009, three years after Lewis. See Abby Goodnough,
Rejecting Veto, Vermont Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al ("The
step makes Vermont the first state to allow same-sex marriage through legislative
action instead of a court ruling, and comes less than a week after the Iowa
Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriages in that state."). These religious
policy debates also occurred before the publication of the first in-depth scholarly
treatment of marriage equality and religious liberty. See SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008)
(proposing policies to advance LGBT equality and religious liberty). Had the
justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court been able to avail themselves of tangible
examples of marriage equality and religious liberty coexisting within existing state
nondiscrimination law and amended family law provisions, it is plausible that the
thin four-to-three margin in Lewis may have been reversed. Similarly, three courts
of last resort declined to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples through state
constitutional interpretations. All three of these cases were decided before
legislative efforts secured marriage equality with religious liberty protections. See
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007) (4-3 decision) (holding that no
state constitutional right to same-sex marriage or marriage-like rights existed);
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d.1, 22 (N.Y. 2006) (4-2 decision) (holding that no
constitutional right to same-sex marriage existed under the New York
Constitution); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 980 (Wash. 2006) (en bane)
(plurality opinion) (4-3 decision) (finding no state constitutional right to same-sex
marriage existed).
236. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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security and international relations concerns.m' Similar interests
reemerged in recent equal protection claims challenging the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs. In Grutter v.
Bollinger,2 38 Justice O'Connor highlighted the national security
advantages of limited race-conscious admissions programs. 239
Professor Bell saw the Michigan affirmative action cases as a
"definitive example"2 0 of his original interest-convergence theory;
in his view, the Court upheld race-conscious admissions policies
that favored Black interests primarily because those interests
converged with Whites'.' These types of national security and
international relations interest convergences will soon materialize
in parallel form in pending sexual minority rights litigation.
In 2011, President Barack Obama officially ended the policy
of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"242 permitting open service in the United
States military.4 The argument that open service aligned with
national security interests justified, at least in part, the law's
repeal.244 The tie between demands for open service and national
security emerged in response to reports that numerous service
members in critical posts, including Arabic translators, were
dismissed under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."245
The Obama Administration repealed the discriminatory
policy in the midst of ongoing litigation 24 6 to invalidate the Defense
237. See Bell, supra note 22, at 524-25.
238. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
239. Id. at 331 ("What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders
of the United States military assert that, [blased on [their] decades of experience, a
highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military's
ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.") (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003)
(discussing both Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), the two
central Michigan affirmative action cases).
241. Id. at 1624 (describing judicial remedies for Black suffering as dependent
upon a perception by policymakers that such relief would "[further] interests or
[resolve] issues of more primary concern.").
242. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
160, § 571, 170 Stat. 1547, 1671, repealed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
243. Elisabeth Bumiller, A Final Phase for Ending 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell,' N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2011, at A13 (outlining the ultimate repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell").
244. See Ed O'Keefe, 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Repealed: Reactions, WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 2011, at A19 (reporting on various perspectives immediately following the
policy's repeal, including sentiments that the policy "undermined our national
security" and that the military "will be stronger because . . . we will have the best
and brightest service members on the job").
245. See Benjamin, supra note 151, at A29.
246. See OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRESS RELEASE 11-
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of Marriage Act."' Soon after the repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"
current service members and veterans joined efforts to challenge
the Defense of Marriage Act.2" Surely, if the interest convergence
Bell identified in Grutter signifies anything, it illuminates an
opening for challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). If
DOMA hinders the ability of the United States military to recruit
highly qualified personnel because the federal government refuses
to recognize same-sex marriages valid in the private sector, the
Act threatens national security vis-h-vis military recruitment.
Pro-LGBT developments have also emerged on the
international affairs front. Recently, the Obama Administration
announced new efforts to promote LGBT rights globally, making
such rights a more prominent component of American foreign
policy.' Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pronounced to the
United Nations Human Rights Council that "gay rights" were
"human rights."25 Though promising, these late 2011 policy
announcements are too recent to truly understand the extent of
their impact on future American diplomacy. As arose in Brown,
the United States can hardly demand universal dignity for a group
of people that neither its own federal nor many of its state
governments treat equally.251
It is in the United States' diplomatic and national security
interests to cease subjugating the LGBT community to second-
class citizenship status, lest the nation suffer from impaired
military preparedness and international accusations of hypocrisy.
222, STATEMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON LITIGATION INVOLVING THE
DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2012) (illustrating two ongoing lawsuits by the Department of Justice challenging
the Defense of Marriage Act prior to the repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell").
247. DOMA, supra note 133. For a discussion about the historical events
surrounding the passage of the Act, see supra Part I.E.
248. McLaughlin v. Panetta, No. 11-11905 (D. Mass. filed Oct. 27, 2011). See
also Ed O'Keefe, Gay Troops and Veterans to Sue over Defense of Marriage Act,
WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2011, at A19 ("The [McLaughlin] suit also challenges
provisions of federal code regarding spouses that lawyers said bar gay couples from
accessing benefits provided by the Pentagon and the Department of Veterans
Affairs. Those benefits include military identification cards, access to bases,
recreational programs, spousal support groups and burial rights at national
cemeteries."). President Obama and Attorney General Holder declined to defend
this suit, claiming it failed to meet constitutional muster under heightened
scrutiny. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 17, 2012), available
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/boehner02-17-12.pdf.
249. See Steven Lee Myers & Helene Cooper, U.S. to Aid Gay Rights Abroad,
Obama and Clinton Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2011, at A4.
250. Id.
251. See Bell, supra note 22, at 524-25.
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If such concerns were sufficient to authorize remedies for
discriminatory governmental treatment in Brown and race-
conscious admissions programs in Grutter, they will certainly play
a role in the inevitable fall of DOMA and marriage inequality in
general.
IV. Rational Basis and the Irrelevance of Scrutiny
The false perceptions of the sexual minority community as
privileged are not, at first blush, universally beneficial in the
constitutional domain. Some prominent scholars on the
intersectional aspects of race and sexual orientation argue that the
myth of privilege is a barrier to full LGBT equality in general,252
and a hindrance to achieving higher levels of scrutiny for sexual
orientation discrimination claims in particular.2 " From a judge's
perspective, it might very well be considerably difficult to apply a
more exacting level of judicial review to a class of people that
appear privileged. If judges-even those sympathetic to LGBT
constitutional rights-view sexual minorities through the same
lens as Justice Scalia does,2 '" applying heightened scrutiny is
questionably justifiable.255
The lack of consensus regarding the application of heightened
scrutiny is clear. Clearer yet, the failure to apply intermediate or
strict scrutiny to sexual orientation discrimination claims does not
256
appear to matter. Take, for example, Perry v. Schwarzenegger.
There, Judge Vaughn Walker applied rational basis scrutiny to
invalidate California's Proposition 8, which constitutionally
banned same-sex marriage in California.2 m Like Perry, the first
judicial mandate for same-sex marriage out of Massachusetts
employed rational basis review.255 In 2008, the California Supreme
Court invalidated a statutory ban against same-sex marriage
using strict scrutiny.' In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court,
252. See Lorde, supra note 228, at 27.
253. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 27, at 1386-88 (arguing that perceptions
of White LGBT privilege prevent sexual orientation claims from receiving more
than rational basis scrutiny).
254. See supra Part II.B.
255. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for
Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L. J. 1 (2010) (discussing the
application of heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation).
256. 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal., 2010), affd sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 2012
WL 372713, at 29 (9th Cir. 2012) (overturning California's same-sex marriage ban
by applying rational basis scrutiny).
257. Id. at 997.
258. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
259. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
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following Connecticut,260 invalidated Iowa's statutory prohibition of
same-sex marriages by invoking intermediate scrutiny under the
Iowa Constitution.26 Th1 use of differing standards of scrutiny to
achieve the same end results is not confined to the marriage
context alone.2
These cases all highlight the same point, as it relates to
interest convergence: scrutiny is irrelevant. So long as the
interests of judges and White elites remain converged with the
interests of the LGBT community due to a perceived common
intersection of identity, and so long as remedies for LGBT
discrimination do not undermine heteronormative interests, LGBT
rights will ultimately prevail.
Conclusion
The gentrification of sexual orientation inoculated gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals against becoming a threat, to the
establishment heteronormative hierarchy. The depiction of sexual
minorities as White, affluent, urban dwelling, educated, and
successful, however, displaces people of color, transgender and
gender-non-conforming individuals, those of lesser means, and
those living in rural America from much of the discourse on sexual
minority rights. The myth of LGBT privilege is a marked
departure from the depictions of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and
transgender people as degenerate, deviant, and predatory that
dominated anti-gay rhetoric in the 1970s and 1980s.26
As this Article demonstrates, the political rhetoric that
framed the LGBT rights movement bled into contemporary legal
argumentation. Chief Justice Burger's influential memorandum
to Justice Powell paralleled the predatory, deviant construction of
sexual minorities that pervaded the political discourse of the late
1970s and early 1980s. In contrast, later opinions penned by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (2008) (applying strict scrutiny
under the California Constitution to strike California's statutory same-sex
marriage ban).
260. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008).
261. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 880 (Iowa 2009) (invalidating Iowa's
statutory prohibition of same-sex marriages using intermediate scrutiny under the
Iowa Constitution).
262. Compare, e.g., Florida Dep't. of Children and Families v. Adoption of X.X.G.,
45 So. 3d 79, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (applying rational basis to strike down
Florida's homosexual adoption ban under the Florida Constitution), with Arkansas
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cole, No. 10-840, slip op. at 145 (Ark. Apr. 7, 2011)
(striking down Arkansas's ban on adoption by cohabiting couples by utilizing strict
scrutiny under the Arkansas Constitution).
263. See supra Part I.A.
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Law and Inequality
Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia reflected the radically
different, elitist perceptions of sexual minorities that anti-gay
activists propagated throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. 264
Interest-convergence theory suggests that this shift was
necessary for sexual minority litigants to achieve success on their
constitutional claims. Provided that these new faux constructions
of LGBT identity remain intact, and provided that newly
promulgated policies neutralize threats to heteronormative
hegemony, there is no practical need to deem sexual orientation as
a suspect class. The degree of scrutiny applied is irrelevant
provided interest convergence remains.
Political rhetoric is not the only source of the privilege myth.
The media and advertising also play a role in perpetuating tropes
of rich, rosy gays and lesbians that fail to communicate the variety
of lived LGBT experiences.26 One needs to look no further than
primetime television to see a rosy portrayal of gays and lesbians
that does not speak to the typical LGBT experience.
It is morally right to open the public's eyes to the reality that
sexual minorities cut a wide swath across many other identities.
Aggressive efforts to eliminate racial prejudices within the White
LGBT community are also necessary. The moral justification for
emphasizing identity intersectionality does not stand alone,
however; it is equally imperative to dispel the whitewashed
privilege myth for the health of future LGBT advocacy efforts.
The constitutional successes that segments of the LGBT
community have enjoyed will not necessarily translate into public
policy success for the entire community. Highlighting the fact that
men, women, transgender and gender-non-conforming individuals
of many races, ethnicities, religions, and levels of socioeconomic
security comprise the sexual minority community can help
overcome the dilemma that the great gay myth created. While the
myth has propelled advantageous constitutional litigation, it
serves as a hurdle to securing discretionary benefits. Making the
case for affirmative action programs or for nondiscrimination
protections in employment, housing, and public accommodations
law is harder if policymakers instinctively link gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals with White privilege. Opponents will stall these
important legislative endeavors by suggesting that sexual
minorities neither deserve nor need nondiscrimination protections
264. See supra Part II for a discussion on the Justices' articulations of LGBT
elitism.
265. See supra note 227.
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because they are privileged and not subjected to discrimination.26 6
As this Article theorizes, popular perceptions of a "privileged"
LGBT community accelerated interest convergence and the
positive advancement of sexual minority constitutional rights. But
at what cost has the rapid recognition of these rights come? And
what costs do gentrified projections of sexual minorities impose
upon current LGBT advocacy efforts?
The LGBT community must examine the virtue in achieving
significant advances in the recognition of constitutional rights on
the backs of the most vulnerable and invisible among our ranks.
The need for reflection and self-examination is not for the LGBT
community alone. Members of the academy, legal practitioners,
sexual minority rights activists, and members of the LGBT
community all have a clear duty to expose "gay wealth" and "gay
White privilege" for the baseless, charged products of fiction that
they are.
266. See, e.g., Rosalind Helderman, No 'Rampant Discrimination' Against Gay
Employees to Argue for Law, McDonnell Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2010,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/virginiapolitics/2010/03/legal-protections-for-gay
snot.html (quoting Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell as saying that "[there really
isn't any rampant discrimination on any basis in Virginia. If you're going to have a
law, it needs to actually address a real problem.") (last visited Sept. 21, 2012);
Mark McGregor, Anti-Gay Bias Not a Problem, City Says, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-SUN,
Feb 28. 2012, available at http://www.springfieldnewssun.com/news/springfield-
news/anti-gay-bias-not-a-problem-city-says-1335890.html (quoting the Springfield
City commissioners, who found "no compelling evidence of discrimination to
substantiate" adding sexual orientation to local nondiscrimination protections) (last
visited Sept. 21, 2012). Views that acts of discrimination against members of the
LGBT community are mere aberrations and therefore do not warrant legislative
action do not comport with reality. See, e.g., BADGETT, supra note 97 (debunking
the myth of gay and lesbian affluence through an economic analysis of the costs of
discrimination); David Christafore & Susane Leguizamon, The Influence of Gays
and Lesbian Coupled Households on House Prices in Conservative and Liberal
Neighborhoods, 71 J. URB. ECON. 258 (2012) (providing empirical evidence of
housing discrimination against sexual minorities in conservative neighborhoods);
Andras Tilcsik, Pride and Prejudice: Employment Discrimination Against Openly
Gay Men in the United States, 117 AM. J. SOc. 586, 605 (2011) (concluding in an
empirical study that openly gay males are forty percent less likely to receive job
interviews than equally qualified heterosexual peers).
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